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24 March 1961

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Mr. Roger Hillsman
The Director of Intelligence
and Research
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Roger:

As I mentioned to you at the USIB meeting on Tuesday, we would like to demur to your letter of March 13 requesting a national estimate on rocketry outside the Soviet Union. I appreciate that the ONE people led you to believe that this would be an acceptable charge, but they did so without exploring the problems that would be created for our technical people in OSI who are very thinly stretched keeping up with high-priority problems in this field.

It is my suggestion that the Department initiate, in consultation with Pete Scoville's people, a requirement for field collection and analysis by scientific and/or military attaches in countries of primary interest to your policy people. If this elicits a useful amount of information and tends to point toward significant foreign capabilities developing in the near-term future, we can then reconsider the desirability of a national estimate on various aspects of the problem. I am certain that in the course of such procedure we will come up with a better end product than if we tried to do the estimate as a first order of business.

Sincerely,

1st Brt

Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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O/DD/I:RAmory, Jr:mhs

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18 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director/Intelligence
THROUGH : Assistant Director/National Estimates
SUBJECT : Special Estimate on Non-Bloc Rocketry
REFERENCE : Letter from Mr. Hillsman, Department of
State, dated 13 March 1961 (Exec Registry
#61-2055) Secret

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for action in paragraph 5 below.

2. The State Department has requested in reference a special estimate on the status of rocketry and space capabilities in non-Bloc countries. The stated purpose in both the reference and conversations with Mr. Farley, the requesting office in State, is to place the State Department in a better position to develop cooperative space programs with non-Bloc countries in light of an European move toward the development of a native space launching capability.


3. Mr. Hillsman's letter requests a vast amount of detailed information on the developments and characteristics of rockets of all sizes. Very little of this information is available in the intelligence community which has been concentrating on high priority Bloc developments. In order to undertake the estimate, a major effort of field collection, correlation, analysis and coordination would be required.

CMAIC has indicated that this might take a year or a minimum of six months, since no backlog of information is available. Furthermore, it would require the use of scarce manpower now working on the Soviet missile problem.

4. The requirement for a national estimate on this subject is, in my opinion, quite unjustified and an estimate on this subject would degrade the whole NIE process. The situation regarding this information is no different from hundreds of routine cases in which knowledge of programs in friendly countries would assist in developing U.S. foreign programs. NIE 100-4-66 has already covered the only subject of national significance, i.e., the development of carriers for nuclear weapons.

5. In view of these facts and particularly of the serious interference of this effort to our intelligence on Soviet programs, I would strongly recommend that the State request be turned down and that it be suggested that State obtain the specific information it needs overtly through its scientific and military attaches in the countries of interest. Mr. Kent has suggested that a special NIE or Annex might be prepared on the surface-to-surface missile capabilities of Nth countries, but

I would recommend that this only be done when a new version of NIE 100-4-60 is done. At that time, a special effort could be made to improve the quality of the work on surface-to-surface missile systems.



for HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

Attachments:

Cy 2 of Ref. Letter (Tab A)
17 Mar 61 Memo to FCI from
AD/NE (Tab B)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - forward
1 - DDCI w/cys Tabs A&B
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

After you have noted, I will show this
to General Cabell for his information.
I have already sent a copy of this letter
to Bob Amory and for appropriate
action.

Fmc

FMC

14 March 1961

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

61-2055

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15 Mar 61

MAR 13 1961

Dear Allen:

The present move toward European development of a space launcher (using the British Blue Streak as the first stage and a French rocket as a second stage) has raised questions about 1) the status of rocketry in countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, and 2) the relationship of such developments to the achievement of capabilities for both space launching and ballistic missile launching.

Our Department requests, therefore, that the intelligence community undertake an NIE along the following lines:

1 - an assessment of the present capabilities in rocketry of countries other than the Soviet Union;

2 - an analysis of the minimum technical, industrial, and financial base necessary for the achievement of a space launching or missile launching capability and an identification of the similarities and differences in the requirements for attaining these two capabilities; and

3 - an estimate of what countries might be expected to achieve such capabilities within the foreseeable future.

In regard to military missile capabilities, we would like the estimate to focus on surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, but we recognize that some assessment of a country's ability in other aspects of missilery will be necessary in arriving at a sound estimate. We do not require detailed technical descriptions of existing or future missiles, but would want to know their essential operational characteristics such as range, warhead capacity, type of fuel, and guidance system. On the space side of the estimate we would be concerned with capabilities for producing special space vehicles of the size of sounding

rockets

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington.

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rockets or larger. In general, our needs would be satisfied if the treatment of non-Soviet missile and space capabilities in the proposed estimate were similar to the treatment of nth country nuclear capabilities in NIE 100-4-60.

We are aware of current limitations on the ability of the intelligence community to analyze the missile and space capabilities of countries other than the Soviet Union. We also recognize that the forthcoming national estimates on Soviet missile and space capabilities (NIE 11-5-61) and Soviet strategic attack capabilities (NIE 11-8-61) will continue to place heavy demands for a few more weeks on those segments of the community who deal with missile matters. However, we would hope that an estimate along the lines we have proposed could be completed within three or four months.

Sincerely,



Roger Hillsman

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March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI

SUBJECT: Hilsman Letter Requesting NIE on Non-Bloc Country Capabilities in SS Missiles and Space Vehicles

BACKGROUND

1. Unknown to me Pete Scoville was approached by someone in the State Department asking that a very ambitious NIE be undertaken on this subject. He received some pretty vigorous discouragement from some.
2. Presumably a few days later the State Department OMAIC member, Flowerce, called and, without recalling Pete's initial reactions, asked my sentiments with respect to this subject. He did not indicate in precise terms the magnitude of the task he had in mind and I, without further checking, indicated a general approval.
3. Later, touching base with Pete, I was informed that the request Flowerce has in mind originated at the level of Phillip Farley's deputy and that the paper he had in mind would

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be on the scale of our NIE 11-5 papers and deal with a score or more of free world countries.

4. I then talked with [] who expressed great reluctance to have OMAIC undertake this kind of task but who said he would not oppose the idea of OMAIC undertaking a far more modest kind of exercise along the lines of State's request.

5. I then checked back with Flowerree to tell him (a) that I had been unaware of the massive sort of study Farley's deputy had in mind, (b) that I would not support a request for this sort of study if it were made, and (c) that I would support the idea of doing a more modest kind of study if the Department would whittle down it's requirements.

RECOMMENDATION

6. I recommend that after completion of 11-5-61 and 11-8-61 we lay on a study which carefully examines the capabilities of a small number of free world countries in the surface-to-surface missile field. At a minimum this paper should deal with the countries of "Nth country" category.

I make this recommendation because the examination of the missile delivery capabilities of these countries as set forth

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in NIE 100-4-00 is by no means up to the standard of the rest of the paper. There are a number of forms this kind of paper could take. For example, it could be an ALE, an SNIE, or an annex to the present 100-4.

7. You will observe that the letter to you from Roger Hillsman, here attached, requests a good bit more than the above.

8. I would further recommend that the chairman of OMAIC be directed to enter negotiations with Mr. Hillsman or the State Department requestor with the aim of fixing the scope of an estimate which, without squandering the community's relatively limited resources in missile intelligence, will best satisfy the demands of the Department of State. The chairman of OMAIC would report the results to the USIB.

LEE-MAN KANG
Assistant Director
National Intelligence

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